In this paper, it is shorn that the Schnorr scheme with preprocessing BE proposed in I41 leaks too much information. An attack based on this information leakage is presented that retrieves the secret key. 
The scheme and the preprocessing algorithm
The identification protocol in the Schnorr scheme [4] is based on the Chaum-Evertsevan de Graaf-protocol [l] . Essentially, it condenses this protocol into one single round. Furthermore, a signature scheme, based on the identification protocol, is given. We briefly describe both the identification protocol and the signature scheme as far as relevant to this paper. For details, see [4] .
Preliminaries
The following parameters are chosen once and for all, and are known to all users: a large prime p, a prime q that divides p -1, a primitive qth root of unity a E I p and a security parameter t . In [4] , it is proposed to take p and q in the order of 512 bits and 140 bits respectively, and t = 72.
Each user chooses a secret key 8 E &*. The corresponding public key is u = a-' mod p. A key authentication center signs, for each user, a string (I, u ) , consisting of the identity I and the public key v of the user. This signature is used to authenticate the public key, but since this is of no relevance to this paper, we w i l l disregard this aspect from now on.
The Identification Protocol
Suppose prover A wants to prove his identity to verifier 5 . First In the rest of this paper, all calculations will be modulo q, except where indicated otherwise.
The Signature Scheme
The signature scheme is an extension of the identification protocol analogous to the extensions of the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater ID protocols [2, 31. That is, a t-bit hash value of the initial commitment x and the message m to be signed replaces the challenge. The signature consists of this hash d u e and of y as in the identification protocol.
Let h denote the hash function that is used to compute the hash value. A message m is signed by signer A as follows. First, A picks a random number T E &* and calculates c = a ' mod p ; from this e = h ( x , m) and y = T t ae are computed. The signature consists of the pair (y, e).
The signature of A on m can be checked as follows. Compute 5 = aW mod p and e = h ( E , m ) . The signature will be accepted if and only if E = e.
-
In the sequel, a pair (y, e) is called a signature, even if it is made by the identification protocol. The attack that will be proposed later on, is based on the assumption that p , q, a, t , and a sufficient number of correct signatures are available. The verifier, for example, possesses this information.
The preprocessing
The aim of the preprocessing is to reduce the computational effort of the prover/signer. A security parameter d determines the number of pairs used in these combinations.
As both the new and the original pairs ( r ; ,~; ) will be used, we will, in contrast to (41, not reduce the indices modulo k. Clearly, this does not alter the preprocessing itself.
Denote the value of T used in the ith initial commitment by ~f , and the initial commitment itself by 2;'. We start numbering from k, for then the index of the initial commitment is the same as the index of the corresponding new r;. Then this index can be used as a sequential number of the signatures. Denote this sequential number by v. We now gme the preprocessing algorithm in detail.
The Preprocessing Algorithm 0. Initialization. Load k pairs ( T ; , z;) as above, 0 5 i < k; In [4] , an algorithm for the computations in step 2 is given that requires d mul- 
v : = v + l ;
In the sequel, it is assumed that the a ( j ; u ) in the preprocessing algorithm are chosen independently from a uniform distribution. It seems reasonable to assume this, as any dependence or non-uniformity can be exploited by an attack.
The preprocessing leaks information
In [4] , a number of possible attacks on the preprocessing in the Schnorr scheme are considered. Subsequently, values for the security parameters k and d are suggested that make those attacks infeasible. In this section, we will look at the preprocessing from another point of view. Instead of considering all possibilities for the u(i; v) or the most likely ones, as is done in [4] , we consider a special case only. This special case has a relatively low probability of occurrence, but it provides a much higher amount of information about the secret key.
The special case we will consider is the event 'for all i, 0 5 i 5 d, a ( i ; u ) takes on one of the values u -1 and v -k'. If this happens, r, is a linear combination of T , -~ and r,-k only. Now, in some cases, only three occurrences of this specid case are needed to find the secret key with high probability, as the following lemma shows. yielding three equations in nine unknowns (the rj's). We will collect a number of addtional equations that link those rj's and s. The h k i n g equations will be provided by the signatures as follows. Since, by definition, r; = 7j-k + 2~j -~ and yj = ~j c + sej €or all j , it follows that
Repeated use of these linking equations enables us to write an arbitrary ?j+,(k-l), c E N, as a linear combination of yj, sej and rj. More precisely, -l)(k-. j+1 -sej+(c-l)(k-l)+l -pj+(c-2)(k-l))) for all positive integers c.
With this equality, we can rewrite the Equations (1)-(3) . The right-hand sides can be rewritten to linear combinations of s, T,-k and known constants, provided the signatures (yj, e j ) are available for 
An attack
From the previous section, it can be concluded that a small number of signatures yield sufficient information to recover the secret key s, provided some of the corresponding T ; ' S satisfy certain conditions. These conditions are stated concisely by the following definition. This leads us to the following idea for an attack. Consider a (large) number of candidates. Then, for all possible ways in which they can fit, do the following. First, calculate the solution i of the corresponding set of equations (1) 
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Note that the order in which the candidates are tried does not matter, for each candidate has the same probability of fitting. In the proofs in the sequel it is assumed for simplicity that they are tried in order of their largest index.
Call the calculation of one estimate a plus the corresponding v a try. The calculations for one try comprise a few modular multiplications and additions modulo q for the calculation of a, the calculation of li requires a full exponentiation modulo p, albeit with a log q-bit exponent only (which is in the order of log p / log q times as fast as one with a log p-bit exponent). Therefore, this exponentiation determines the workload of one try.
The following lemma gives the probability that an arbitrary candidate fits.
Lemma 4.2 The probability that a single arbitrary signature fits is (i , "-' .
probability that an arbitrary candidate {i, i + a ( k -1)) i + b(rC -1)) fits, is With the aid of the above lemma, the required number of signatures can be calculated. 
Proof:
We prove this lemma in two steps. First, the expected number of signatures needed to have 1 fitting signatures is calculated, for general 1. Then the probability that the lth fitting signature completes the first fitting candidate is calculated.
Suppose a large set of consecutive signatures is available. The probability that the mth element in the sequence is the Ith fitting one, is (cf. Lemma 4.2)
Therefore, the expected position in the sequence of the Ith fitting signature is
Denote the probability that the lth fitting signature completes the first candidate in the sequence by P(I = I). Since the the probability that a signature fits is independent of its index, the fitting signatures are uniformly distributed over the indices modulo le -1. We see that P(I = E ) is the probability that the lth signature that fits is the third one for its index mod k -1, and no other index mod k -1 has occurred three times yet. Therefore, trivially P(I = I ) = 0 if I < 3 or I > 2k -1. In general, the related expectation E,1 is hard to evaluate, but obviously E,I < 2k -1.
It is easy to see that the expected required number of signatures N , necessary to obtain exactly one fitting candidate, equals N = ($)"-' . E,I, from which the result follows.
From this, the number of signatures required for an attack can be calculated. This is done in the next theorem. < 22(d-2) , then the expected number of consecutive signatures N', necessary for a successful attack is less than 2k -(!)"-'.
Proof: N' is smaller than N times the expected number of fitting candidates that provides an independent system of equations, for this is the required number if we would start all over in case of a dependent system. (In that case we 'loose' all fitting signatures encountered so far.) That is, N' < N / P , where P = P(independent), see Proof: We calculate the number of steps in the attack, given that n1 signatures are required to complete the attack. The set of the n' signatures used in the attack is partitioned into k -1 subsets according to the index of the signature mod k -1.
These subsets have size approximately n ' / ( k -1). For each triple of signatures in each of these subsets, we have checked whether this triple is a fitting candidate. So the number of candidates we tried before we had a fitting signature is 
Conclusions
The idea of preprocessing [4] is interesting, because by using a preprocessing algorithm, an exponentiation can be performed with the effort of a few multiplications only. However, one must be cmeful using preprocessing dgorithms, for these leak information. When used in the Schnorr scheme, the preprocessing algorithm, as proposed in [4] , leaks too much information, for the attack presented in this paper enables retrieving the secret key from on average two thousand signatures in on average 237.' steps. Since the calculations for this attack can be performed in parallel to a large extent, the attack does not seem infeasible.
The proposed attack exploits the following properties of the preprocessing algorithm from [4) , and seems to depend on them.
A Independence of equations in the attack
The attack presented in this paper is based on the possibility of solving the set of equations we obtain from Equations (1) 
I=1
The probability that these equations are independent is the probability that the first two columns are different times the probability that the third column is not a linear combination of the first two columns, given that those are different. This latter probability follows from the fact that for any choice of A, Ea, A", p" and e;++-l) for c < b there is exactly one e,+qk-1) E &* that makes the third column a linear combination of the first two columns (for there is one d u e of E b that does so). Since we also have ei+b(k-l) < 2', the probability that this happens is certainly less than 2-:.
Hence we have P = P(independence) > (1 -P( +.\ -p = 3 -p' = :A' ' -P I ' ) ) 0 (1 -2-*) and p < 1 -P($ -p = ;A' -p' = -p"),
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Now X is the sum of the powers 2' over those j for which u(j;i) = i -1, and p is the sum of the other powers 2' with 0 5 j 5 d. Therefore, it is not hard to see that every choice of the u( j ; i)'s yields a unique value of +A -p . Thus it holds that LA-p 2 = i X ' -p ' = fA"-ji'ifandonlyifcr(j;i) = u(j;i+u(K-l)) = u ( j ; i + b ( k -l ) ) (whch happens with probability one quarter) for all j. From this it follows that (1 -( y d -2 ) ) . (1 -2-9 < P < (1 -( y d -2 ) ) .
For d = 6 and t = 72, we have P x g.
